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“Now Holly won’t say hi to me ‘Cause I’m in love with my anxiety” 
– The Hold Steady, “Ask Her for Adderall”, Stay Positive (2008) 
 
I was not surprised that this particular song lyric kept getting stuck in my head while I was 
reading this book; they both strike a similar chord. Kurth doesn’t go quite so far as to recommend 
that we, too, should be in love with our anxiety, but he certainly wants us to appreciate it more than 
we typically do. His concise and crisply written monograph makes a good case that we should. It 
deepens our understanding of what anxiety is, and of how it animates different facets of our mental 
and moral lives. The case he builds that, roughly, anxiety is one of the brain’s ways of affectively 
signaling and responding to uncertainty is clearly argued and meticulously organized. Kurth hits the 
targets he sets for himself, and advances his agenda in a way that I found largely convincing. The 
result is a book that is a must-read for anyone working on anxiety and other moral emotions, and 
that will reward anyone who is curious about the nature and value of this increasingly, and perhaps 
alarmingly, prominent component of our minds. 
By using his empirically supported account of  anxiety as a single, well-delineated lens 
through which to probe issues in moral theory, Kurth is participating in a recognizable trend. Entries 
in this recently coalesced tradition include numerous collected volumes (see especially the series on 
the Moral Psychology of  the Emotions, edited by Mark Alfano and published by Rowman & 
Littlefield) and monograph length treatments dedicated to specific parts of  our moral minds. Early 
installments focused on components like our facility with rules (Nichols 2004, and also 2021), or our 
propensity to explain and assess behavior by appeal to character traits (Doris 2002). Many of  the 
trend’s more recent and visible exemplars, however, have looked at specific emotions and affective 
states like disgust (Nussbaum 2004, Kelly 2011), happiness (Haybron 2008), contempt (Bell 2013), 
anger (Nussbaum 2016, Cherry forthcoming), empathy (Bloom 2016), and hope (Martin 2016). Of  
the many virtues of  this divide-and-conquer approach, one is that sustained, selective attention to 
distinct components of  our moral minds can better clarify the idiosyncrasies of  how each one 
operates, thus bringing into focus its unique contributions to thought, evaluation, and behavior. 
This, in turn, can inform close and careful analysis of  whether and which of  the contributions 
distinctive to each one we should embrace or reject. For example, Cherry argues anger is 
indispensable to fighting racism, while Bloom holds that appeals to people’s empathy should be 
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replaced with appeals to rational compassion. For those who wish to avoid the use of  certain 
emotions, the empirical detail can help guide efforts to effectively minimize their influence, either in 
constructing moral theory, shaping policy, designing nudges, or living our own individual lives. 
The Anxious Mind is an important addition to this genre. In between its introduction and 
conclusion are five substantive chapters arranged in two parts, each of  which is devoted to 
addressing one of  the book’s two main questions. In response to the first, “what is anxiety?”, Kurth 
develops and defends an account that perhaps surprisingly construes anxiety as an emotion we share 
with other animals, rather than as a mood, disorder, or some more amorphous or uniquely human 
feeling. He then turns in the second part to a number of  normative matters that grow out of  the 
fundamental question of  whether anxiety is ever valuable. Building on the psychological account he 
develops in the first part, Kurth argues that while anxiety, like most other emotions, can occasionally 
misfire and is thus not immune from producing pathological outcomes, it can and often does 
provide an array of  benefits, both practical and moral. 
While the details covered in the first part are important to the normative claims in the 
second, many are interesting in their own right. Kurth considers a range of empirical literatures, and 
his treatment of them is careful, thorough, and judicious. The interdisciplinary approach used to 
substantiate the more specific claims can be demanding, both on the practitioner and the reader, but 
the effort lends the account of anxiety a particular kind of heft. Kurth has very much brought the 
receipts, and his arguments cannot be easily dismissed. Indeed, responsible engagement with those 
arguments would seem to demand similar methodological sophistication, and the willingness to 
follow Kurth into the empirical trenches, so as to reckon with his reasoning on its own terms. 
Luckily for the curious reader, he is not only a skilled practitioner but an artful writer, and the more 
technical parts of  his discussion are anchored with concrete and gripping examples that illustrate his 
theoretical points while keeping the inevitable abstraction and jargon from getting overwhelming.  
One of  the central and most interesting claims that Kurth defends here is that anxiety is an 
affect program, and so qualifies as a member of  the same family of  emotions as more familiar 
exemplars like disgust, fear, joy, and anger. Each of  these can be distinguished from the others along 
several dimensions; indeed, Kurth argues convincingly that anxiety is a distinct emotion from fear. 
But affect programs share a number of  characteristics (62) that mark them as members of  a single 
family (and perhaps as a genre of  psychological natural kinds, a la Griffiths 1997): 1) each supports a 
fairly close stimulus-response pairing that produces an adaptive reaction to a class of evolutionarily 
salient threats and opportunities, 2) each is homologous to a similar emotion-like state found in 
other primates and mammals, 3) each involves a distinctive pattern of neural and physiological 
activity, 4) the characteristic response of each is activated quickly and directly once any of the 5) 
relevant stimuli are automatically detected and appraised as such. In making the case that anxiety fits 
this bill, Kurth identifies several subtypes of the emotion (environmental, punishment, and 
practical), but argues that they all share the core function of detecting conditions of uncertainty and 
potential threat, and activating psychological processes to increase alertness, minimize risk, and 
intensify assessment of the situation. Anxiety is a sensitivity not to clear and present danger but 
rather to menacing ambiguity and the ominous unknown. The response it triggers is protective, but 
rather than inducing a specific fight or flight behavior in response to a concrete threat, it ramps up 
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hunger for information, inducing us to look before we leap and think before we act. This function is 
carried out in slightly different ways in different domains, when the core mechanisms that perform it 
work in conjunction with different companion psychological systems—hence the three subtypes. 
Moreover, as with other affect programs, differences in circumstance, culture, and the norms that 
shape and govern anxiety can produce further variations on the emotion’s core themes, some of 
which can be quite dramatic (for more general discussion see Mallon and Stich 2000, and for an 
especially striking and detailed example see Simons 1996 on surprise and the startle reflex). 
Assuming this picture is broadly correct raises further interesting questions. For example, if 
anxiety is an emotion, is it usefully thought of as an epistemic one (Morton 2010, Carruthers 2017)? 
On Kurth’s view, and especially in light of his discussion of the “accuracy motivation” triggered by 
practical anxiety (70, 165-172), this does not seem implausible. If the claim that anxiety is an affect 
program is surprising, perhaps one reason is that the response produced by most instances of the 
category involve reflex-like tendencies for overt behaviors, often recognizable forms of physical 
approach (anger) or avoidance (fear, disgust). The core elements of anxiety, on the other hand, 
appear less aimed at producing knee-jerk actions (and may actually inhibit them) and more towards 
gathering and sifting through information relevant to better grasping a murky situation, so as to 
better figure out what an appropriate action would be. Exploring how anxiety compares and 
contrasts to other epistemic emotions like insight (Gopnik 1998), mirth (Hurley et al 2011), curiosity 
and interest (Carruthers 2018), boredom (Millgram 2004, Westgate and Steidle 2020), and confusion 
(Vogl et al 2019) promises to shed further light both on these individual instances and on the 
intriguing category of epistemic emotions in general. Kurth does not take up these questions—he is 
more at pains to establish anxiety’s affect program bona fides, and to distinguish it from other affect 
programs like fear and surprise, on the one hand, and from other mental states that have recently 
occupied a similar place in the public imagination like scrupulosity and existential angst, on the 
other. His detailed account of anxiety, however, provides an ideal platform from which to launch a 
systematic investigation into its similarities and differences with other epistemic emotions (also see 
Vazard 2019 for thoughts along these lines). 
The second half of the book addresses more straightforwardly normative issues. Kurth first 
takes up questions about anxiety’s value, arguing that it is not some irredeemably maladaptive bug in 
our psychological makeup, but is instead often a fitting response to the circumstances that activate it. 
When it is, it can provide, in different settings, instrumental, aretaic, or moral benefits, all of which 
flow from the way it directs attention and induces caution and reflection. Kurth builds on this 
position in the next chapter, arguing that these values can be cultivated through this emotion (c.f. 
Kurth 2021). He develops his view that well-attuned anxiety can be incorporated into an account of 
virtuous agency that is skill-based but also countenances an important role for deliberation and 
explicit reasoning, thus giving it an advantage on grounds of psychological plausibility. A chapter on 
progress goes further still, noting that while it can obviously go astray, adversely affecting mental 
health and feeding morally regressive attitudes (euphemistic uses of “economic anxiety” come to 
mind), properly cultivated anxiety has and will likely continue to play important positive roles in 
driving moral improvement, at both the individual and collective level. 
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In making his case throughout this part, Kurth is also contributing to a broader school of 
thought. A central strand of the Romantic tradition is skepticism about the idea that characteristics 
like serenity, tranquility, and sage-like repose are ideals, representing the kinds of psychological states 
we should aspire to achieve. Though it is more by implication than explicit argumentation, Kurth’s 
defense of anxiety’s value lends support to such skepticism. It also points to an alternative ideal that 
sees unpleasant affect and psychological conflict as having their virtues too. Perhaps the Romantics 
were right to worry that someone free from angst and anxiety, who was untroubled by any 
experiences of their own attitudes struggling to correct one another, would be in danger of 
becoming boringly static or stifled, without impetus to mature, grow, or improve. 
These discussions are consistently insightful and thought-provoking. They also pair well 
thematically with earlier chapters. The first part of the book succeeds as a modestly revisionary 
account of what kind of mental state anxiety is; the second succeeds as a modestly rehabilitating 
account of what it is good for, especially from the point of view of moral theory. Together the 
arguments found here can serve as a corrective to the connotations the emotion has recently 
accrued, that make it easy to see anxiety as something like conscientiousness run amok, and so as 
unavoidably corrosive psychologically, ethically, or both. On Kurth’s alternative picture anxiety has 
its uses. Despite its unpleasant phenomenology and the bad rap it gets from our folk psychology, it 
is better seen as a morally legitimate and potentially powerful tool. Progressives and would-be 
reformers may want to better understand it, so they might more effectively harness and direct its 
power towards morally desirable ends (c.f. Kelly and Morar 2014 on disgust). 
The concluding chapter situates the account within an evolutionary context, focusing on 
how anxiety might fit with recent work on the roots of cooperation and morality. Kurth considers 
research that sees our species’ emergence as being driven by an increased reliance on and facility 
with cumulative culture, by the unique forms of cooperation that have been unlocked by our 
systems of culturally inherited, punishment-stabilized social norms, and by the distinctive kind of 
psychological machinery we have evolved handle them. The discussion here is intriguing, more 
speculative than the book’s tightly argued body, but finishing this way is strategically sound. By 
closing with some allusive ideas rather than just recapitulating his previously established theses, the 
programmatic ending has a refreshingly expansive feel, opening up and suggesting lines of thought 
that can be pursued from the sturdy foundation provided by the rest of the book. I will end with 
comments on two that seem most promising, offered less as criticisms than suggestions for moving 
forward. 
The first is about where anxiety might fit into the puzzling landscape of normative 
motivation. In his discussion of norms, Kurth draws primarily on recent work by Kitcher (2011) and 
Sterenly (2012, 2013), focusing on fear of punishment and reasoning from there to the other roles 
that might be available to anxiety. A larger perspective on the psychology of normative cognition 
(e.g. Kelly and Setman 2020) suggests a wider and more interesting range of options. There is reason 
to think that internalizing any norm entails becoming intrinsically motivated to both follow it and to 
enforce it (Sripada and Stich 2007, Chudek and Henrich 2011). However, different emotions (fear, 
anger, disgust, contempt, shame, guilt, etc.) can provide these intrinsic motivations for different 
norms (Rozin et al 1999, Haidt 2001, Nichols 2004, Kelly 2020, c.f. Prinz 2009). Anxiety, though, 
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with its core functions of inducing caution and increased attentiveness, does not seem a good 
candidate to provide either the compliance or punishment motivation that mark internalization. It 
appears better suited, however, to perform a function that is importantly different from those 
typically assigned to emotions in the context of norm psychology. 
More specifically, anxiety can provide a useful response to situations that are normatively 
ambiguous, or in which normative conflict arises when several norms are potentially applicable, but 
each prescribes a behavior incompatible with the others. On this picture, anxiety helps snap a person 
out of the intuitive and relatively unthinking kind of cognition that often drives behavior guided by 
internalized norms, that allows her move smoothly through the less fraught parts of her social world. 
When a person encounters normative ambiguity or conflict, the activation of her anxiety leads her to 
explicitly consider the situation and to think more carefully about how to proceed in it. In some 
cases, this may lead to internal deliberation about the specific case. In others, it may push the person 
to look outward, searching for more clues in the social world about the best way forward. In still 
others, anxiety might be instrumental in prompting a person to formulate and avow a new norm for 
the type of situation in question, rather than continuing to rely on any of the potentially relevant 
norms acquired from her peers and culture (Kelly forthcoming). While it is less clear that anxiety is 
equipped to provide the distinctive kind of motivational resources a person would need to resolutely 
abide by these kinds of self-imposed personal rules (c.f. Setman and Kelly in press), this emotion may 
be crucial for sparking the sequence of reflective, self-regulative processes that leads people to 
fashion and adopt them. This seems broadly consistent both with the idea that anxiety is an 
epistemic emotion, and with Kurth’s arguments that it often makes important contributions to 
moral progress. 
The second comment concerns the operation of anxiety in our current moment, and the 
worry that it is alarmingly widespread—and was even before the COVID-19 pandemic. Put as a 
question, one might reasonably wonder if we are, as it seems to many, living in a new Age of 
Anxiety, and if life in contemporary WEIRD cultures is especially, systematically, toxically anxiety-
inducing. Kurth is not sure—for example he acknowledges that diagnoses of anxiety disorders have 
recently spiked, but cites (120) Horwitz and Wakefield’s (2012) suggestion that the trend is mainly 
due to diagnostic criteria being applied more liberally that in the past. Certainly more data will 
further clarify the situation, but the theoretical components of Kurth’s view can help inspire and 
sharpen hypotheses, too. 
The bad rap the emotion gets in our contemporary folk psychology, and that Kurth’s 
arguments about its value are in part set against (Kurth 2015), may still be justified. As mentioned 
above, circumstances and cultural norms can shape the functioning of affect programs and 
emotions, pushing some to the margins of a society while moving others center stage, making them 
more hypertrophied, conspicuous, and difficult to avoid in the lives of its members. Consider in this 
context the advent of the internet and the digital panopticon of social media, and the unprecedented 
forms of interpersonal visibility and interconnectivity they make available. Examples of massive 
inequality and widespread systemic injustice are now on constant display, and the enormously 
complex algorithms that put them in front of our eyeballs are being constantly personalized to keep 
us looking and engaged. The interpersonal comparisons this invites can give rise to many forms of 
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psychological distress, and Kurth’s view suggests a specific one. His subtype of punishment anxiety is 
triggered by the possibility of receiving negative evaluations or sanctions from others. Life online is a 
life of unnaturally constant evaluation, where assessments are explicitly represented by the 
functionality of the different venues (numbers of followers and likes, space for comments, etc.), and 
are often made by an audience that has the potential to be enormous, wildly heterogenous, virtually 
inescapable, and invested with trolls (see e.g., Tolentino 2019). This sounds like a perfect storm for 
generating punishment anxiety on a mass scale. 
If this characterization is on target, it would not be the first time that humans have created, 
unintentionally or with malice aforethought, technologies and cultural environments that exploit our 
own biological and psychological vulnerabilities (see Ross 2020 for a sophisticated discussion along 
these lines about addiction). Moreover, as similar technological innovations accumulate and the 
contexts in which we live continue to become increasingly culturally constructed and more distant 
from those of past generations, more of these kinds of vulnerabilities are apt to be exposed. Projects 
like Kurth’s can help us to better understand the mismatches that often arise between the different 
components of our individual psychological repertoires (moral and otherwise), on the one hand, and 
the context in which they are being asked to operate, on the other. An important companion point, 
though, is that thinking through the value (moral and otherwise) of each psychological mechanism 
will increasingly require also taking into account the character of the particular cultures, 
technologies, institutions, and social structures in which it performs its functions (Kelly 2017, 
Muthukrishna et al 2021). 
This book is already a valuable contribution to moral psychology, and is well positioned to 
serve as a building block in this broader kind of work in the future. It shaped and sharpened, 
changed and clarified many of the previously vague thoughts I had about anxiety, and it took me in 
directions I wouldn’t have expected beforehand. I’m still not in love with my anxiety, but Kurth has 
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